Abstract:

With the continuous advancement of financial supply-side structural reform, controlling the market risk premium and reducing the cost of equity financing are the key tasks to revitalize the steady growth of real economy. As the core force of enterprise value creation, does the executive ability have an inhibitory effect on the financing cost? Using the data of A-share listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen mainboards, this paper empirically tests the influence mechanism of executive ability on the cost of equity financing, and brings the director network relationship into the analysis framework as a supplementary mechanism of formal institutional defects. It is found that the enhancement of executive ability reduces the cost of equity financing; the improvement of director network position promotes the negative correlation between them, and this conclusion excludes the substitution effect of enterprise size, but is subject to political factors interference brought by the nature of property rights. Further distinguishing the internal structure characteristics of director network, and analyzing the situational effect by introducing the director interlocks strength and the director intimacy, it is also found that both the weak interlocks of external director and the low director intimacy promote the governance effect of director network position. However, enterprises need to be alert to the negative impacts of strong interlocks of internal director and high director intimacy.

Key words: executive ability, cost of equity financing, director network location, director interlocks strength, director intimacy

摘要：

随着金融供给侧结构性改革的持续推进，控制市场风险溢价、降低股权融资成本是盘活实体经济稳步增长的重点要务，而高管能力作为企业价值创造的核心力量，对融资成本是否具有抑制作用？运用沪深主板A股上市公司数据，实证考察高管能力对股权融资成本的影响机理，并将董事网络关系作为正式制度缺陷的补充机制纳入分析框架。结果显示：高管能力的增强降低了股权融资成本；董事网络位置的提高促进了两者之间的负相关性，且该结论排除了企业规模的替代效应，但受到产权性质带来的政治因素干扰。进一步剖析董事网络的内部结构特征，引入董事联结强度与董事亲密度进行情境效应分析，发现外部董事弱联结与低董事亲密度均强化了董事网络位置的治理效果，企业需要警惕内部董事强联结与高董事亲密度产生的消极影响。

关键词: 高管能力, 股权融资成本, 董事网络位置, 董事联结强度, 董事亲密度