Abstract:

This paper studies whether the manufacturer should independently offer trade-in service himself or allow his retailer to offer trade-in service in a closed-loop supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer, where either the manufacturer or the retailer may provide trade-in services and bear the corresponding fixed trade-in cost. It first develops three decision models for the closed-loop supply chain under the scenarios of no trade-in service, manufacturer undertaking trade-in service, and retailer undertaking trade-in service, respectively. Then, it analyzes the game in offering trade-in services between the supply chain members when considering fixed trade-in cost. The results show that with the change in the fixed trade-in cost, the manufacturer and the retailer may get into conflict because both of them prefer to offer the trade-in service or both prefer to be a “free rider”, instead of undertaking the trade-in service by himself/herself. In this case, either of them can eliminate such conflict, or “free-riding”, by providing appropriate compensations to the other, thus both sides are more profitable than when no trade-in service is available. However, as the total profit of the closed-loop supply chain system is still sub-optimal, the manufacturer can further design corresponding contracts based on the centralized decision model to achieve closed-loop supply chain coordination.

Key words: closed-loop supply chain, trade-in, pricing, coordination mechanism

摘要：

考虑制造商和零售商构成的闭环供应链，双方都可能提供以旧换新服务并承担相应的固定成本，研究了制造商应该自主提供以旧换新服务还是让零售商提供以旧换新服务的问题，分别构建了无以旧换新服务、制造商提供以旧换新服务和零售商提供以旧换新服务3种闭环供应链决策模型，分析了考虑以旧换新固定成本时供应链成员提供以旧换新服务与否的博弈。结果表明：随着以旧换新固定成本的变化，制造商和零售商可能会因都想提供以旧换新而产生冲突，也可能会因都想让对方提供以旧换新而成为“搭便车”者。此时，制造商或零售商可以通过给对方提供适当补偿来消除这种冲突或“搭便车”现象，以使双方利润都比无以旧换新时更高，但闭环供应链系统总利润仍为次优。为此,制造商可进一步基于集中决策模型设计相应的契约来实现闭环供应链协调。

关键词: 闭环供应链, 以旧换新, 定价, 协调机制