Abstract:

Technical standard alliance is an important carrier to achieve technical standardization. Due to the disparity between different enterprises in technical basis, absorptive capacity, and market control, the technical standardization of alliance has the characteristic of delay. However, the impact of delay on alliance technical standardization is not yet clear. Therefore, a differential game model for the technical standardization of alliance enterprises is established considering the influence of delay. The optimal strategy, optimal income, standard research and development, and diffusion of alliance leading and supporting enterprises under three different game mechanisms are investigated, and the influence of standardization delay on strategy selection of alliance enterprises is discussed. The results show that the delay has a positive impact on the degree of standardization effort, technology level, and standard market share of the alliance enterprises, but has a negative impact on the proportion of standardization cost borne by the leading enterprises for supporting enterprises and the overall income of the alliance. Moreover, there are three thresholds for the delay. Only when the delay is less than the minimum threshold, the cooperative mechanism is significantly better than that of other mechanisms. When the delay is greater than the maximum threshold, alliance members reach the optimal decision under Nash non-cooperative mechanism. Furthermore, the three mechanisms have different promoting effects on the standardization of the alliance. The Nash non-cooperative mechanism can only slowly promote technical standardization when the alliance has a low degree of development, and the collaborative mechanism can promote the technical standardization to a large extent and accelerate the diffusion of technical standards on the basis of the high development degree of the alliance.

Key words:

technical standard alliance, technical standardization, differential game, delay effect

摘要：

技术标准联盟是实现技术标准化的重要载体，由于不同企业在技术基础、吸收能力和市场把控等方面存在差距，联盟的技术标准化存在延迟特征。然而，延迟时间对联盟技术标准化产生的影响尚不明确。基于此，在考虑延迟效应影响的基础上，构建了联盟企业技术标准化问题微分博弈模型，考察了3种不同博弈机制下联盟主导企业与配套企业的最优策略、最优收益和标准研发及扩散情况，探讨了标准化延迟时间对联盟企业策略选择的影响。研究发现：延迟时间正向影响联盟企业的标准化努力程度、技术水平和标准市场占有率，负向影响主导企业为配套企业承担的标准化成本比例和联盟整体收益。延迟时间存在3个阈值，只有当延迟时间小于最小阈值时，协同合作机制才明显优于其他机制；当延迟时间大于最大阈值时，联盟成员在Nash非合作机制下达到最优决策。3种博弈机制对联盟标准化的促进作用不同，Nash非合作机制只有在联盟发展程度较低时才能缓慢地促进技术标准化行为，协同合作机制能够在联盟发展程度较高的基础上仍以较大的幅度推动技术标准化，加快技术标准的扩散。

关键词:

技术标准联盟, 技术标准化, 微分博弈, 延迟效应