Abstract:

Large-scale water resources allocation projects have the characteristics of linear distribution. The project legal person generally organizes multiple contractors to construction project in parallel, i.e., trade with multiple contractors at the same time. From the perspective the principal-agent theory, this is a “one-to-many” principal-agent relationship. In this situation, the project legal person may face moral hazards originated from multiple contractors at the same time. This paper constructs a tournament incentive model that considers psychological preferences in the characteristics of large-scale water resources allocation projects, and analyzes the effect of wage gaps and psychological preferences on multi-contractor effort levels. The research results show that the contractor’s optimal effort levels in terms of quality, construction period, and safety will increase with the increase in the tournament incentive gap, and decrease with the increase of the contractor’s effort cost coefficients. In addition, the contractor’s optimal effort levels will decrease with the increase of the sympathy preference coefficient, and increase with the increase of the jealous preference coefficient. Therefore, identifying the psychological preferences of multi-contractor and formulating an appropriate tournament incentive mechanism are of great significance to improve the construction performance in large-scale water resources allocation projects.

Key words:

construction project management, water resources allocation projects, tournament incentives, psychological preferences

摘要：

大型水资源配置工程特点是呈线状分布，项目法人一般组织多个工程承包方平行实施，即与多个承包方同时交易。在委托代理理论视阈下，这属于“一对多”的委托代理关系，即项目法人要同时面临源自多个代理人/承包方的道德风险。构建了考虑心理倾向的锦标激励模型，通过经典激励模型的求解，分析锦标激励差额及心理倾向对多承包方最优努力水平的影响。研究发现，承包方在质量、进度和施工安全上的最优努力水平随着锦标激励差额的增加而增加，随着承包方努力成本系数的增加而减少；承包方在这3个目标上的最优努力程度随着同情心理倾向系数的增加而减小，随着嫉妒心理偏好系数的增加而增加。因此，正确识别多承包方的心理倾向程度，并制定恰当的锦标激励机制，对提高大型水资源配置工程的建设绩效具有重要意义。

关键词:

项目管理, 水资源配置工程, 锦标激励, 心理倾向