Abstract: The empowerment of grassroots governance through digital technology has brought unprecedented opportunities and challenges to grassroots work in the contemporary era. How to effectively avoid the formalism trap in digital streamlining and solve the dilemma of “digital suspension” has become the core issue of empowering grassroots governance with digital technology. This paper constructs an SEIQR evolutionary game model, integrating the strategic interactions between local governments and the public into an improved infectious disease model. It deeply explores the dissemination and evolutionary mechanisms of the “digital suspension” phenomenon in grassroots governance, focusing on effective solutions from both behavioral evolution and value perception perspectives. The research findings reveal that higher cost of public information absorption hinders the control of negative administrative behavior, while higher public satisfaction helps to suppress its spread. Solely relying on government credibility-building cannot significantly improve the effectiveness of controlling negative behavior. The government needs to pay attention to factors related to the implementation of digital systems, such as costs associated with digital system construction, in order to better mobilize the enthusiasm of local governments and the public. Under conditions of bounded rationality, the strategic evolution of game participants is influenced by perceived gains and losses, with changes in the reference point for gains exerting a particularly significant controlling effect on negative administrative behavior.

Key words: grassroots governance, digital suspension, SEIQR model, evolutionary game theory

摘要： 数字技术赋能基层治理为新时代基层工作带来了前所未有的机遇与挑战。如何有效规避数字减负中的形式主义陷阱、破解基层治理中的“数字悬浮”困境，已成为当前数字赋能基层治理的核心议题。本文构建SEIQR演化博弈模型，将地方政府与公众的策略互动行为融入改进的传染病模型，深入剖析基层治理中“数字悬浮”现象的传播与演化机制，尤其从行为演化与价值感知的双重视角出发，探讨破解“数字悬浮”困境的有效路径。研究发现：公众信息吸纳成本较高不利于消极行政行为的控制，而公众获得感较强则有助于抑制其传播；仅依靠政府公信力建设难以显著提升对消极行为的管控效果，政府需关注数字制度构建成本等与行为执行相关的因素，以更好地调动地方政府与公众的积极性；在有限理性条件下，博弈参与方的策略演化受感知收益与损失的影响，其中收益参考点的变化对消极行政行为的控制作用尤为显著。

关键词: 基层治理, 数字悬浮, SEIQR模型, 演化博弈