Abstract: In the debt structure of Local Government Financing Platforms (LGFPs), LGFPs are the nominal debtors while local governments are implicit contingent debtors. In the debt extension restructuring of LGFPs, whether local governments acknowledge or implement their contingent guarantee obligations may change the repayment source of LGFPs and affect the repayment expectation of banks. This paper describes the effects of the implicit compensation expectation of local governments on the debt extension modes and related welfares. It is concluded that when the renewal debt is expected to be difficult to get paid, LGFPs will prefer “self-repayment-style debt extension” which is paid off only by LGFPs, but banks prefer “compound-style debt extension” which is paid off jointly by LGFPs and local governments. In this case, LGFPs are inclined to leave aside the contingent guarantee obligations of local governments, but banks are eager to implement the aforementioned obligations. Besides, when the renewal debt is expected to be fully paid off, LGFPs will prefer “compound-style debt extension”, but banks prefer “self-repayment-style debt extension”. It seems that banks prefer the enhancement and improvement of the self-repayment ability of LGFPs, rather than the additional supplement of local governments in the way of improving solvency. Moreover, from the perspective of LGFPs and banks, the “compound-style debt extension” is better than “self-repayment-style debt extension”. As a co-decision maker, they have strong incentives to take advantage of the interests of local governments. Furthermore, although debt extension contributes to temporarily ease the repayment pressure of LGFPs and create time or conditions to regain solvency etc., it can only adjust the distribution structure of related welfares but does not help to improve the overall welfare of all participants.

Key words: local government financing platforms (LGFPs), debt extension, debt restructuring, strategy selection, welfare effect

摘要： 在融资平台债务结构中，融资平台是名义上的借款主体和偿债主体，地方政府是隐性的或有代偿主体。在融资平台存量债务的展期重构过程中，地方政府是否坐实或落实其或有担保责任将改变融资平台的偿债方式和银行的获偿预期，本文模型刻画了地方政府的隐性代偿预期对银企双方债务展期重构的模式选择及其福利影响。主要结论有：① 当预期展期债务难以获得清偿时，融资平台偏好自偿型债务展期，而银行偏好复合型债务展期（由融资平台和地方政府共同清偿），此时融资平台倾向于撇开地方政府的或有代偿责任，银行则渴望落实地方政府的担保责任。② 当预期展期债务能够获得充分清偿时，融资平台偏好复合型债务展期，而银行偏好自偿型债务展期。在偿债能力的提升途径中，银行更偏好融资平台自偿能力之增强，而非地方政府或有代偿之补充。③ 仅从银企双方的福利改善状况来看，复合型债务展期优于自偿型，但若将银企双方视为决策群体进行审视，它们同有“揩地方政府油水”的强烈动机。④ 尽管债务展期有助于缓释融资平台即期偿债压力，给其恢复偿债能力赢得时间或条件，但其仅能调节有关福利的分配结构，并不能增进全体参与者的总体福利。

关键词: 地方政府融资平台, 债务展期, 债务重构, 策略选择, 福利影响