Abstract: Under the dual background of carbon quota mechanism and blockchain technology, this paper addresses the issue of low-carbon investment strategies in the power supply chain. It develops a two-tier electricity supply chain model consisting of a power generator and a power retailer, capturing four scenarios based on whether blockchain technology is adopted and whether the grandfathering or benchmarking allocation mechanism is used. With a Stackelberg game theory framework and using backward induction, it yields the following findings: Regardless of whether blockchain technology is adopted, the level of low-carbon investment, electricity demand, and retailer profits are always higher under the benchmarking mechanism compared to the grandfathering mechanism. Under any carbon quota mechanism, when the cost of applying blockchain technology is relatively low, adopting blockchain leads to higher levels of low-carbon investment, greater electricity demand, and increased profits for both the generator and the retailer compared to scenarios without blockchain adoption. Moreover, low-carbon investment and the profits of supply chain enterprises increase with consumers’ green trust and environmental preferences, and decrease as the costs of low-carbon technology investment and blockchain application rise.

Key words: electricity supply chain, carbon quota, blockchain technology, carbon reduction investment

摘要： 在碳配额机制和区块链技术双重背景下，本文针对电力供应链低碳投资策略问题，构建了由发电商与售电商组成的二级电力供应链模型。基于Stackelberg博弈理论框架，分别刻画了祖父法和基准法两种碳配额分配方式下，是否采用区块链技术的4种情形，并通过逆向归纳法进行求解分析。研究结果表明：无论是否应用区块链技术，基准法下的低碳技术投资量、电力需求量和售电商利润总是高于祖父法；在任意碳配额机制下，当区块链技术应用成本较低时，采用区块链技术时的低碳技术投资量、电力需求量以及发电商和售电商利润均高于未采用区块链技术的情形；此外，低碳技术投资量和电力供应链企业利润随消费者绿色信任与绿色偏好的增强而提高，随低碳技术投资成本与区块链技术应用成本的增加而减少。

关键词: 电力供应链, 碳配额, 区块链, 低碳投资