Abstract:

The classical contract theory cannot explain the pay for luck and over determinate contract, which has been found and proven by many empirical studies. Aimed at solving the contradiction, fairness preference is introduced in this paper and a behavioral principal-agent model is developed for approach of behavioral game theory, which finds that the optimal incentive contract under fairness does include luck and hereby is over determinate. This not only theoretically explained why the pay for the executive is generally influenced by luck and why the contract is always over determinate, which solves the contradiction between theoretic and empirical findings, but also explains why many companies offer the stock ownership plan to normal employees except the executive, which are also found in the empirical studies. Therefore, regardless of the executive or normal staff, it is necessary to accurately screen the fairness and the reference group for the incentive system.

Key words: pay for luck, incentive contact, over determinate, fairness

摘要：

在运气薪酬和激励契约超完全性质上，经典契约理论与实证发现结果之间存在矛盾。针对这一问题，引入公平偏好，应用行为博弈论方法建立行为委托代理模型，求解发现公平偏好下的最优激励契约就是包含运气的超完全契约。这不但为运气薪酬和激励契约超完全性质提供了一种理论解释，消除了理论与实证研究之间的矛盾，而且能够解释实证研究发现很多公司向高管人员之外的普通员工提供持股计划的实际现象。因此，无论对高管人员还是普通员工，在制定薪酬激励制度时，准确甄别公平偏好特征和判断参考群体范围都是必要的。

关键词: 运气薪酬, 激励契约, 超完全, 公平偏好