Journal of Systems & Management ›› 2021, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (2): 332-343.DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1005-2542.2021.02.012
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WANG Yuyan,LU Lingxue,SU Mea,SHEN Liang
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王玉燕,吕灵雪,苏梅,申亮
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Abstract: Under the influence of the old and new kinetic energy conversion policies, three decision-making models, i.e., decentralized decision-making models with and without retailers’ fairness concern and centralized decision-making model, considering government rewards were constructed. Then, the optimal decisions of the three models were given, and the impacts of new kinetic energy innovation cost and fairness concern coefficient on pricing, new kinetic energy innovation investment, recovery rate and profit of all participants were analyzed, based on which, the “income sharing joint fixed cost-cost sharing” contract was designed to achieve coordination. The research shows that with the increase of innovation cost, the conversion efficiency of new and old kinetic energy decreases, and the negotiation space between the manufacturer and the retailer reduces. However, the wholesale price and the sales price decreases with the innovation cost, which is different from the opinion that “the price increases with the increase in investment”. Moreover, as the fairness concern coefficient increases, the innovation investment, the recycling rate, the consumer effect and the profits of the members reduce, but retailer’s share of the profits of the system increases. Furthermore, in centralized decision-making, the innovation investment, the profit of all parties, and the recycling rate are the highest, while the sales price is the lowest, which can be achieved by designing the coordination mechanism of “income sharing joint fixed cost-cost sharing”. And in this mechanism, who benefits more from recycling activities will bear more recycling costs.
Key words: new kinetic energy innovation investment, fairness concern, closed-loop supply chain, coordination mechanism
摘要: 新旧动能转换政策的出台对闭环供应链提出了新的要求与挑战,考虑政府奖励机制,构建公平中性的分散决策、零售商公平关切的分散决策及集中决策3种决策模式。给出3种模式的最优决策,并分析新动能创新投入成本、公平关切系数对闭环供应链定价、新动能创新投入、回收率及各方利润的影响。在此基础上,设计“收益共享联合固定费用-成本共担”契约实现分散决策的协调。研究显示:随着创新成本的增加,新旧动能转化效率降低,制造商和零售商的谈判空间变小,同时批发价和销售价格降低,这与传统“投入越高售价越高”的观点不同;零售商的公平关切行为不仅损害了主导企业制造商的利润,也损害了己方利润,同时降低了新动能创新投入水平、回收率和消费者效用,但增加了己方系统利润的占比;集中决策下新动能创新投入、回收率和各方利润最高,零售价格反而最低,可以通过“收益共享联合固定费用-成本共担”协调机制达到这种效果。并且,在该机制下,在回收活动中受益越多的企业,承担的回收成本越多。
关键词: 新动能创新投入, 公平关切, 闭环供应链, 协调机制
WANG Yuyan, LU Lingxue, SU Mei, SHEN Liang. Decision-Making and Innovation Investment of CLSC under Fairness Concern[J]. Journal of Systems & Management, 2021, 30(2): 332-343.
王玉燕, 吕灵雪, 苏梅, 申亮. 公平关切下闭环供应链的决策与创新投入[J]. 系统管理学报, 2021, 30(2): 332-343.
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URL: https://xtglxb.sjtu.edu.cn/EN/10.3969/j.issn.1005-2542.2021.02.012
https://xtglxb.sjtu.edu.cn/EN/Y2021/V30/I2/332
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