Abstract: Aimed at solving the problem of carbon emission reduction, promotion and government subsidy strategies in the low-carbon supply chain, a differential game model of the supply chain consisting of manufacturers and retailers were constructed with government participation under the background of low-carbon. Taking both the carbon emission reduction and goodwill as state variables, and considering the fact that the demand was affected by both the carbon emission reduction and goodwill, the feedback equilibrium strategies of the government and supply chain under different decisions was analyzed, and further discussed in combination with numerical analysis. The results show that the cost-sharing contract can achieve Pareto improvements in the profits of manufacturers and retailers under certain conditions, when there is no government subsidy. At the same time, the carbon emission reduction of product, goodwill, and the demand are increased. Besides, the optimal emission reduction effort of manufacturers, the optimal promotion effort of retailers, and the optimal subsidy coefficient of the government are not related to time, when there is government subsidy. The government subsidy offered to supply members of the chain is related to the structure and status of the game. Moreover, the government subsidy plays an effective role in regulating the profit distribution of enterprises in the supply chain.

Key words: government subsidy, cooperation on carbon emission reduction, goodwill, promotion effort, differential game

摘要： 在低碳背景下，针对低碳供应链减排、促销以及政府补贴策略问题，构建政府参与下由制造商和零售商构成的供应链微分博弈模型。将产品减排量和商誉作为状态变量，且考虑产品减排量和商誉同时影响需求下，分析不同决策下政府和供应链的反馈均衡策略，进一步结合算例进行讨论分析。研究发现：无政府补贴时，在一定条件下，成本分担契约可以实现制造商和零售商利润的Pareto改善，且提升了产品减排量、商誉以及需求；有政府补贴时，3种决策下制造商的最优减排努力、零售商的最优促销努力以及政府最优补贴系数均与时间无关；政府对供应链成员的补贴大小跟博弈结构以及地位都有关；政府补贴对供应链成员企业的利润分配起到了良好的调节作用。

关键词: 政府补贴, 合作减排, 商誉, 促销努力, 微分博弈