Abstract: Equity pledge has gradually become one of the financing channels for controlling shareholders, and the resulting risk of transfer control affects the innovation activities of enterprises. This paper, taking A-share listed companies from 2013 to 2018 as the research object, discussed the relationship between equity pledge and enterprise innovation and constructed the research route of “equity pledge management risk preference innovation effectiveness”. By using the fixed effect model, it reached the following conclusions: The controlling shareholders’ pledge of stock rights will inhibit the substantive innovation of enterprises in the first phase of lag, but it has no effect on the strategic innovation of the lagging phase. Besides, management risk preference plays an intermediary role in the relationship between controlling shareholders’ equity pledge and firm’s substantial innovation. Moreover, compared with the state-owned sample, the shareholder’s equity pledge in the private sample has a higher degree and explanatory power to inhibit substantive innovation by weakening management risk preference. It is further found that the degree of restraint on substantial innovation of shareholders’ equity pledge in the case of “two jobs in one” is higher than that in the sample of non-combination of two positions. It is, therefore, suggested that controlling shareholders should treat equity pledge dialectically. In addition, management should play a role of internal governance to restrain shareholders’ opportunism behavior. Furthermore, external investors should judge the real operation status of enterprises with the help of innovative achievements, and revise investment decisions.

Key words: equity pledge, substantial innovation, strategic innovation, risk preference of management

摘要： 股权质押逐渐成为控股股东的融资渠道之一，由此产生的控制权转移风险影响了企业创新活动。以2013~2018年A股上市公司为研究对象，探讨股权质押与企业创新的关系，构建了“股权质押-管理层风险偏好-创新成效”的研究路线，采用固定效应模型，得出：控股股东股权质押会抑制企业的滞后一期实质性创新，但对滞后一期策略性创新无显著影响；管理层风险偏好在控股股东股权质押对企业实质性创新的抑制关系之间起到了中介作用；相较国有样本，民营样本中股东股权质押通过削弱管理层风险偏好抑制实质性创新的程度和解释力更高。进一步发现，两职合一的股东股权质押对实质性创新的抑制程度高于非两职合一样本。控股股东应辩证地对待股权质押行为，管理层应发挥内部治理作用来抑制股东机会主义行为，外部投资者应借助创新成果判断企业真实经营状况，修正投资决策。

关键词: 股权质押, 实质性创新, 策略性创新, 管理层风险偏好