Abstract: Based on the dynamic changes of desertification control scale and enterprise goodwill, a differential game model of desertification control between two competing enterprises is constructed. The product pricing, the desertification control investment level, the desertification control scale, and the revenue changes of both parties are studied in different governance technology authorization modes. It is found that the optimal pricing of products with desert characteristics of the two enterprises and the investment level of the technology licensor are not affected by the technology authorization mode. Without technical authorization, the revenues of both enterprises are the lowest. In the license fee technology authorization mode, the investment level and desertification control scale of the licensee and the revenues of both enterprises are improved, and the revenue growth rate of the licensee is greater than that of the licensor. In the fixed fee technology authorization mode, the investment level, the desertification control scale of the authorized party, and the revenues of the two enterprises are the highest, and the desertification control scale of the two enterprises are the same at this time.

Key words: desertification control, sand industry, differential game, technology authorization

摘要： 在沙漠化治理规模和企业商誉均动态变化的基础上，通过构建两竞争企业治理沙漠化的微分博弈模型，研究了不同治理技术授权模式下双方的产品定价、沙漠化治理投入水平和治理规模以及收益变化。研究发现，两企业经营的沙漠特色产品最优定价和技术授权方的沙漠化治理投入水平均不受技术授权模式影响。在无技术授权情况下，两企业的收益均处于最低水平。在特许权费用技术授权模式下，被授权方的沙漠化治理投入水平和治理规模以及两企业的收益均有提高，且被授权方的收益增长幅度大于授权方的收益增长幅度。在固定费用技术授权模式下，被授权方的沙漠化治理投入水平和治理规模以及两企业的收益均最高，且此时两企业的沙漠化治理规模相同。

关键词: 沙漠化治理, 沙产业, 微分博弈, 治理技术授权