Abstract: Considering the fact that market demand is sensitive both to retailing price and product quality, this paper examines the optimal financing and operational decisions in supply chain where a capital constrained manufacturer determines the product quality and sells goods to a capital sufficient retailer. The manufacturer's financial pressure can be alleviated via three financing schemes, i.e., advance payment, bank financing, and hybrid financing (a combination of equity financing and bank financing). In addition, it formulates the Stackelberg game models to derive the optimal decisions and compare the respective profit  for each party in three financing modes. Moreover, it analyzes the effects of various parameters on the optimal decisions, including quality investment cost efficient, unit production cost efficient, advance payment ratio, and equity financing ratio. The results show that the product quality will be higher under advance payment mode than that under bank financing mode when the manufacturer's initial capital is in certain range and the advance payment ratio is bellow certain threshold. Though the product quality and ordering quality in hybrid financing is higher than those in bank financing, the overall profit of the supply chain is lower than that in bank financing.

Key words: capital constrains, quality, advance payment, bank financing

摘要： 考虑市场需求受产品价格和质量水平的双重影响情形下,研究了资金约束制造商和资金充足零售商组成的供应链的融资与运营决策, 其中制造商可通过零售商的提前支付、银行融资或由股权融资和银行融资组合的混合融资来解决资金约束问题。通过构建3种融资方式下的Stackelberg 博弈模型, 研究了制造商与零售商的最优定价及质量决策, 对比了制造商和零售商在3种融资模式下的利润, 并借助算例分析了质量投入成本系数、单位产品成本系数、提前支付比例及股权融资比例对资金约束供应链均衡决策的影响。结果表明: 当制造商初始资金水平处在一定范围且提前支付比例小于某一阈值时, 零售商提前支付模式下制造商提供的产品的质量水平将更高; 相较于银行融资, 尽管混合融资下产品的质量水平和订购量更高, 但供应链整体利润却较银行融资时低。

关键词: 资金约束, 质量, 提前支付, 银行融资