Journal of Systems & Management ›› 2025, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (4): 980-993.DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.2097-4558.2025.04.006

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Incentive and Coordination of Carbon Reducing Contract for Retailer-Dominated Supply Chain Under Asymmetric Information

XIONG Bo1, HUANG Chenxing1, ZHU Xiaowu1, ZHANG Peng2   

  1. 1. School of Statistics and Mathematics, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, Wuhan 430073, China; 2. School of Management, Shanghai University of International Business and Economics, Shanghai 201620, China
  • Received:2023-02-06 Revised:2023-08-12 Online:2025-07-28 Published:2025-08-11

非对称信息下零售商主导供应链的碳减排合同激励与协调

熊波1,黄晨星1,朱小武1,张鹏2   

  1. 1.中南财经政法大学 统计与数学学院,武汉 430073;2.上海对外经贸大学 工商管理学院,上海 201620
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目(11801570);中南财经政法大学中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(2722021BX024);中南财经政法大学研究生科研创新平台项目(202251307)

Abstract: Under the context of asymmetric information regarding manufacturers’ emission reduction efficiency, and considering cap-and-trade system and consumers’ low-carbon preference, this paper develops a two-tier supply chain system consisting of a single dominant retailer and a single manufacturer. It develops three Stackelberg game models—centralized decision-making, decentralized decision-making with symmetric information, and decentralized decision-making with asymmetric information to examine how the retailer can design incentive mechanisms to induce the manufacturer to truthfully disclose its emission reduction efficiency, thereby achieving a coordinated optimization of both economic and environmental performance. The results show that under symmetric information, a two-part tariffs contract can ensure system-wide optimal performance. Under asymmetric information, a menu of contract enables information sharing. For manufacturers with high emission reduction efficiency, such a contract can coordinate the supply chain; however, the retailer must pay an information rent, which may increase or decrease depending on changes in the carbon price and consumers’ low-carbon preferences. For manufacturers with low emission reduction efficiency, the extent of system efficiency loss depends on the retailer’s accuracy in estimating the manufacturer’s emission reduction capability. Numerical analysis further indicates that strengthening carbon price regulations, promoting low-carbon consumption, and providing technical support for emission reduction are effective measures to help achieve emission reduction goals.

Key words: asymmetric information of carbon reduction efficiency, dominant retailer, low-carbon supply chain management, cap-and-trade system

摘要: 针对制造商减排效率信息非对称情境,结合碳配额交易机制与消费者低碳偏好,构建了单个主导零售商和单个制造商组成的二级供应链系统。分别建立了集中决策、对称信息分散决策和非对称信息分散决策3种Stackelberg博弈模型,研究零售商如何通过激励机制设计促使制造商披露真实减排效率,以实现经济与环境绩效的协同优化。研究表明:在对称信息下,两部制合同可确保系统绩效最优;而在信息不对称时,菜单合同能实现信息共享。对于高减排效率制造商,该合同下可协调供应链,但零售商需支付信息租。对于低减排效率制造商,系统效率损失程度取决于零售商对其减排效率的预估准确性。此外,信息租随碳价与消费者低偏好的变化可能增减。数值分析进一步指出,提高碳价管制强度、引导低碳消费及提供减排技术支持等措施有助于达成减排目标

关键词: 减排效率信息非对称, 零售商主导, 低碳供应链管理, 碳配额交易

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