Abstract: In response to the high-risk exposure in mega projects and considering the potential role of insurance institutions in onsite risk management, this paper develops a multi-period incentive model for owners and contractor groups under the participation of insurance institutions. Based on a computational experimental approach, it simulates the evolution of risk management behaviors of different stakeholders under various scenarios, exploring the effects of fairness preferences, incentive mechanisms, and insurance participation on the efficiency of risk management incentives. The results indicate that the fairness preference of contractors significantly impacts incentive effectiveness. Dynamic incentives implemented by owners and insurance institutions are significantly more effective than static, constant incentives. Proactive participation by insurance institutions effectively promotes the risk management efforts of mega projects, enhancing the payoffs of all parties involved. These findings offer new theoretical insights and decision-making guidance for risk management in mega projects.

Key words: mega project insurance, risk management, incentives, computational experiments

摘要： 针对重大工程建设面临的高风险暴露特征，并考虑保险机构参与现场风险管理的潜在动能，构建了保险机构介入下业主与承包商群体的多周期激励模型。研究采用计算实验方法,模拟了不同情景下各主体的风险管理行为演化，探究了公平偏好、激励机制及保险机构参与等因素对风险管理激励效率的影响。研究发现：承包商的公平偏好心理显著影响激励效果；业主与保险机构采取动态激励方式显著优于静态恒定激励；保险机构主动参与能有效促进承包商的风险管理努力行为，提升各参与方收益。研究结果为重大工程风险管理实践提供了新的理论视角与决策参考。

关键词: 重大工程保险, 风险管理, 激励, 计算实验