Journal of Systems & Management ›› 2021, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (1): 119-132.DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1005-2542.2021.01.011
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YU Hui,LI Yaxun
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于辉,李亚勋
作者简介:
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Abstract: It is one of the important problems faced by enterprises to choose the right object of operation cooperation after financing. This paper applies the mean-variance model to study the choice of operational cooperation partners after supplier equity financing in the case of suppliers not participating in cooperation, cooperation between suppliers and retailers, and cooperation between suppliers and retailers and investors. It is found that cooperation between suppliers, retailers, and investors is the best choice. If the cooperation between suppliers and retailers is not possible, the choice of cooperation between suppliers and retailers will be affected by the amount of financing and the degree of risk aversion of channel members. If the amount of financing of suppliers is small and the degree of risk aversion of retailers is relatively high, suppliers choose to cooperate with retailers. In other cases, suppliers choose not to cooperate with retailers.
Key words: equity financing, risk aversion, supplier
摘要: 企业融资后选择合适的运营合作对象是其面临的重要问题之一。应用均值-方差模型分别在供应商不参与合作、供应商与零售商两者合作以及供应商与零售商、投资方三者合作的情形下研究了供应商股权融资后运营合作对象的选择问题。核心发现:供应商与零售商、投资方三方共同合作是最优选择;如不能争取三方合作,供应商是否要与零售商合作的选择会受到融资额与渠道成员风险规避程度的影响,如果供应商的融资额较小且零售商的风险规避程度相对较高,供应商则选择与零售商合作,其他情形下,供应商选择不与零售商合作。
关键词: 股权融资, 风险规避, 供应商
CLC Number:
F 272.3
YU Hui, LI Yaxun. A Model for Vendor Operating Cooperation Selection in Equity Financing[J]. Journal of Systems & Management, 2021, 30(1): 119-132.
于辉, 李亚勋. 股权融资下供应商运营合作对象选择问题模型[J]. 系统管理学报, 2021, 30(1): 119-132.
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URL: https://xtglxb.sjtu.edu.cn/EN/10.3969/j.issn.1005-2542.2021.01.011
https://xtglxb.sjtu.edu.cn/EN/Y2021/V30/I1/119
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