Abstract: The intense global patent litigation, especially opportunistic lawsuits, have a detrimental impact on the continuity and stability of corporate innovation, hindering the achievement of strategic goals for achieving high-level technological self-reliance and self-improvement. A thorough investigation into the timing strategies of patent litigation is conducive to elucidating the essence of strategic litigation in industrial practices, guiding patent litigation back to its fundamental purpose of protecting and incentivizing innovation. Therefore, building upon evolutionary game theory, this paper establishes a three-stage game model between patent-holding enterprises and those accused of patent infringement, which enables an analysis of the game dynamics and stable strategies of both parties. Moreover, it contextualizes the time strategies of patent litigation within the scenario of Star Market IPO. Additionally, utilizing Matlab software, it conducts a simulation to elucidate how pivotal factors influence the strategic behaviors of both parties in patent litigation. The research findings indicate the existence of evolutionarily stable equilibrium strategies in the behavioral games of both parties in patent litigation. The timing of litigation significantly impacts the game strategies of both parties, while the duration of litigation demonstrates a more moderate effect. Specifically, among factors related to litigation timing and duration, the influences of settlement fees, long-term litigation benefits, and significant indirect costs are particularly pronounced. Furthermore, as patent validity transitions from low to high, the effects of litigation timing and duration on the game strategies of both parties in patent litigation become more (less) pronounced. The discussion on the time strategy of patent litigation from the perspective of evolutionary game enriches and expands the literature on time and patent litigation, and has strong practical significance for guiding enterprises how to initiate or respond to strategic patent litigation.

Key words: evolutionary game, patent litigation, time strategy, litigation timing, litigation duration, star market IPO

摘要： 全球范围内，频繁的专利诉讼特别是伺机诉讼行为，对企业创新持续性和稳定性产生负面影响，不利于实现高水平科技自立自强的战略目标。深入研究专利诉讼的时间策略，有助于明晰产业实践中策略性诉讼的本质，引导专利诉讼回归保护与激励创新的初衷。基于此，本文运用演化博弈理论，构建了专利权企业与被诉专利侵权企业的三阶段博弈模型，剖析双方的博弈关系与稳定策略，并将专利诉讼时间策略具体应用于科创板上市诉讼场 景。研究运用Matlab软件进行模拟仿真，廓清了关键因素对专利诉讼双方博弈行为的影响路径。研究结果表明，专利诉讼双方的行为博弈存在演化稳定均衡策略；诉讼时机对专利诉讼双方博弈策略选择具有显著影响，而诉讼时长的影响相对温和。具体而言，在诉讼时机与诉讼时长相关因素中，和解费、长期诉讼收益及重大间接成本的影响更为突出；当专利有效性由低转向高时，诉讼时机与时长对专利诉讼双方博弈策略的影响效应分别呈现强化与弱化趋势。本研究从演化博弈视角系统探讨了专利诉讼时间策略，丰富和拓展了时间维度与专利诉讼领域的理论文献，对企业如何有效发起或应对策略性专利诉讼具有实践指导价值。

关键词: 演化博弈, 专利诉讼, 时间策略, 诉讼时机, 诉讼时长, 科创板IPO