Abstract: Accelerating the development of new quality productivity and realizing high-quality growth are of great significance to the manufacturing industry. Based on a clear understanding of the formation logic, manifestations, and functional roles of new quality productivity forces in manufacturing industry, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model involving core (chain-leading) enterprises, participating (in-chain) enterprises, and the governments, to analyze the collaborative cultivation dynamics of new quality productivity and the law of evolution, and to investigate the effectiveness of different incentive mechanisms. The research findings indicate that collaborative cultivation of new quality productivity in manufacturing depends heavily on internal collaboration within the industrial and supply chains, where costs and benefits play a critical role. Due to the significant dynamics and inconsistency of decision-making among multiple actors, internal collaborative for fostering new quality productivity is often misaligned. However, external incentives from the government can effectively improve the alignment and efficiency of internal collaboration. Clarifying the influence of subjective factors such as risk preferences and reference effect—and establishing appropriate control mechanisms—is key to overcoming inherent path dependence and realize the transformation from traditional productivity to new quality productivity. Based on these findings, this paper proposes several policy recommendations from the aspects of constructing a dual-center synergy mechanism led by both the “chain leader + chain master” enterprises, constructing a dual incentive mechanism system of “reward and punishment mechanism + economic means”, and strengthening risk assessment and early warning systems related to the qualitative leap in productivity, etc., to support the coordinated cultivation of new quality productivity across the manufacturing industrial supply chains.

Key words: new quality productivity, industrial and supply chains, chain master enterprises, incentive mechanism, evolutionary game

摘要： 加快形成新质生产力、实现高质量发展对制造业具有重要意义。本文在厘清制造业新质生产力形成的逻辑、表现形式与主体职能基础上，构建了由链主企业、在链企业与政府共同参与的制造业产业链供应链新质生产力协同培育演化博弈模型，系统分析其协同培育演化规律，并探讨激励机制的效力。研究结果表明：制造业新质生产力协同培育依赖于产业链供应链的内部协同，成本与收益在其中起到关键作用；由于多主体行为决策具有显著的动态性与不一致性，新质生产力的内部协同培育往往处于非协调状态，而政府的外部激励能够有效提升内部协同的协调性；明确风险偏好、参照效应等主观因素的影响机制，并制定相应控制规则，是克服固有路径依赖、实现从传统生产力向新质生产力转型的关键。基于研究结论，本文从构建“链长+链主”双中心协同机制、构建“奖惩机制+经济手段”相结合的双重激励体系、加强对生产力质态跃迁的风险研判等方面提出对策建议，以助力制造业产业链供应链新中质生产力的协同培育。

关键词: 新质生产力, 产业链供应链, 链主企业, 激励机制, 演化博弈