Abstract:

To reduce the serious social harm caused by sudden emergencies, the government requires that the enterprises should strengthen daily emergency equipment reservation. In fact, the goals that the government and the enterprise pursue are generally inconsistent, and the information the government and the enterprise get is often asymmetric. Therefore, the total effort of the enterprise will decline, which brings potential risk to equipment supply in emergency. In order to solve this problem, in this paper, the principal-agent relationship between the government and the enterprise was studied, and the interest game between the two parties under the condition of asymmetric information was analyzed. Besides, the incentive model of emergency equipment reservation was built. Moreover, the optimal solutions to the reward-punishment coefficient and incentive coefficient of the government, the optimal effort of the enterprise, as well as the profits of both parties were attained. Furthermore, numerical examples and sensitivity analysis were used to verify the effectiveness of the proposed model, and the influence of several exogenous variables on the optimal decision strategies of the enterprise and the government as well as their benefits was discussed. Finally, some practical management implications were proposed.

Key words: emergency equipment reservation, incentive model, principal-agent theory, subsidy constraint

摘要：

为了减轻突发事故引起的社会危害，政府明确规定生产经营性单位一定要做好应急设备的储备工作。但在实际情况下，政企追求目标并不一致，政府对企业努力水平也不能做到全面监测，使得企业很容易产生违规操作或投机行为，造成企业努力水平降低，在突发事故发生时很难保障充足的应急设备。为了解决这一问题，研究了政府与企业之间的委托代理关系，分析了信息不对称条件下的政企利益博弈，构建了应急设备储备系统激励模型。根据政府补贴有无约束条件，求解了政府最优奖惩系数与激励系数、企业最优努力水平以及双方的收益。进一步，采用数值算例与敏感性分析验证了该模型的有效性，讨论了若干重要外生变量对政企最优决策策略与双方收益的影响，进而提出具有实践意义的管理启示。

关键词: 应急设备储备, 激励模型, 补贴约束, 委托代理理论