Abstract:

This paper mainly studies how the firm restricts the behavior of supply chain members by signing an effective contract (such as a payback contract or a buyback contract) under the uncertainty of the supply chain. Specifically, it considers a two-stage manufacturer-retailer supply chain with both demand and production uncertainties. It studies the Stackelberg game model in a pricing-order-production-sales cycle, in which the purpose of each party is to maximize its profits. It theoretically proves that there exists a unique equilibrium between the optimal input output and optimal order quantity that maximizes profits, revealing the impact of factors such as production costs, wholesale prices, and uncertainty in production and demand on the equilibrium. Finally, from the perspectives of manufacturers and retailers, it compares their profit levels under different contract mechanisms. For manufacturers, when the retail compensation unit price is relatively high compared to the manufacturer’s production cost, in most cases, the compensation contract is better than the repurchase contract. When the retail compensation unit price is relatively low compared to the manufacturer’s production cost, it is exactly the opposite. For retailers, in most cases, repurchase contracts are superior to compensation contracts, with the only exception being when the manufacturer’s product profit margin is relatively small, production uncertainty is high, and demand uncertainty is low.

Key words:

buyback contract, payback contract, production uncertainty, demand uncertainty

摘要：

在供应链存在不确定性的情况下，企业之间通过签订有效的契约（如补偿契约或回购契约）对供应链成员的行为进行约束。研究了需求和生产不确定同时存在时，一个两级供应链中的制造商和零售商在一个定价-订购-生产-销售周期内进行斯坦伯格博弈的模型，各成员的目标均为实现自身利润最大化。从理论上证明了使利润最大化的最优投入产量和最优订购量均衡存在且唯一，揭示了生产成本、批发价格、生产与需求的不确定性等因素对均衡的影响。最后，从制造商和零售商角度比较了其在不同契约机制下的利润水平。对于制造商，当零售商补偿单价相对于制造商生产成本较高时，多数情况下补偿契约优于回购契约；当零售商补偿单价相对于制造商生产成本较小时则恰好相反。对于零售商，多数情况下回购契约优于补偿契约，唯一的特殊情况是制造商产品盈利空间相对较小、生产不确定较大以及需求不确定较小。

关键词:

回购契约, 补偿契约, 生产不确定性, 需求不确定性