Abstract:

China has proposed to develop the circular economy for nearly 30 years. Although considerable achievements have been made, effective policies and regulations are still needed to further promote the circular economy, especially when facing the goal of “carbon peaking and carbon neutrality” and the requirements of high-quality development. By taking the supervision role of the public on governments and enterprises into account, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model with the characteristics of government approval, enterprise reporting, and public supervision. Then, it constructs a system dynamics model to further analyze the impact of the public supervision, government incentives, and the punishment of making falsified report on the equilibrium solution. The results show that public participation can effectively compensate for the lack of government supervision by restricting the behavior choice of enterprises and the governments. By transforming the public into the most extensive supervisor of circular economy, a win-win situation among governments, enterprises, and the public can be achieved.

Key words:

circular economy, public opinion,  , evolutionary game,  , system dynamicss

摘要：

中国提出发展循环经济已经近30年，取得可观成就的同时，面对“碳达峰”“碳中和”目标以及经济、社会高质量发展的要求，仍需有效的政策引导和监管机制推进循环经济进一步发展。构建包含公众参与的循环经济监管模式，将公众对政府审查机制和对企业上报机制的监督作用考虑在内，构建以政府审查、企业上报、公众监督为主要特征的演化博弈模型，并进一步构建系统动力学模型，分析公众舆论、政府激励、政府对企业的谎报惩罚等对均衡解的影响。结果表明：公众参与能够有效弥补政府监督的不足，同时制约企业和政府的行为选择，在成为循环经济最广泛的监督者的同时，实现政府、企业、公众的三方共赢。

关键词:

循环经济, 公众舆论, 演化博弈, 系统动力学