Abstract: As market competition intensifies, e-commerce platforms have increasingly launched consumer credit services. Suppliers that support such services can stimulate consumer willingness to purchase through consumption in advance but must bear the risk of bad debts caused by repayment defaults. Based on a market composed of an e-commerce platform and two vertically differentiated competing suppliers, this paper examines the launch and adoption strategies of consumer credit services by the platform and suppliers. The findings indicate that the platform will opt to offer the service when bad debt risk is low and the additional utility of consumer credit is high. Although adopting consumer credit allows suppliers to increase their prices and expand demand, it does not necessarily increase their benefits. Specifically, the high-quality supplier never introduces consumer credit independently; when the additional utility of the service is moderate, only the low-quality supplier adopts it; and when the additional utility is substantial, both suppliers are willing to adopt the service. Moreover, greater intensity of quality competition invariably increases high-quality suppliers to adopt consumer credit, while the low-quality suppliers may become less inclined to do so. Further analysis reveals that if both suppliers adopt the same consumer credit strategy, increasing quality competition always harms the platform. However, if the two suppliers adopt different strategies, the platform may benefit from intensified quality competition.

Key words: consumer credit, supplier competition, e-commerce platform, game theory

摘要： 随着竞争日趋激烈，电商平台纷纷推出消费信贷服务。支持该服务的供应商可以通过超前消费提升消费者购买意愿，但需承担还款逾期的坏账风险。基于一个电商平台与两个垂直质量差异的竞争供应商组成的市场，研究电商平台与供应商的消费信贷服务推出及引入策略。研究发现：当坏账风险较低且消费信贷带来的附加效用较高时，平台会选择推出该服务。尽管供应商引入消费信贷服务可提高产品定价并扩大需求，但其利润未必随之增加。具体而言：高质量供应商从不单独引入消费信贷服务；若消费信贷服务附加效用适中，仅低质量供应商引入；若消费信贷服务附加效用显著，两个供应商均会引入。质量竞争强度的增加一定会提升高质量供应商引入消费信贷的意愿；然而，对于低质量供应商，其引入意愿可能反而降低。进一步分析表明：若两供应商采取相同的消费信贷引入策略，质量竞争强度的增加始终对平台不利；若两供应商采取不同的消费信贷引入策略，平台反而可能从更加激烈的质量竞争中受益。

关键词: 消费信贷, 供应商竞争, 电商平台, 博弈论