Abstract: The practice of responding to crisis events, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, has demonstrated that firms can effectively manage production disruption risks through horizontal collaboration and resource sharing, such as capacity sharing. However, there has been limited literature exploring and comparing the coordination mechanisms and risk resilience of different capacity-sharing contracts when horizontally competing firms face production disruption risks. This paper, considering two common types of capacity-sharing contracts: the ex-ante revenue sharing contract and the ex-post transfer payment contract, develops a game-theoretic model between manufacturers with horizontal competition, analyzes and compares the equilibrium between manufacturers across four different models: separate operation, centralized operation, and two capacity-sharing contracts. The findings indicate that both types of capacity-sharing contracts enhance manufacturers’ ability to withstand disruption risks, with the ex-ante revenue sharing contract achieving the same level of resilience as the centralized operation model. Under both capacity-sharing contracts, manufacturers’ expected profits are always higher than those of the separate operation model. The ex-ante revenue sharing contract is appropriate when the disruption probability is high or the shortage penalty cost is low, while the ex-post transfer payment contract is more appropriate when the disruption probability is low and the shortage penalty cost is high. In capacity-sharing transactions, contrary to the ex-post transfer payment contract, the concession ratio of the production interrupter under the ex-ante revenue sharing contract tends to decrease as the shortage penalty cost increases, even approaching zero. Interestingly, in the context of production disruption risks, the implementation of capacity sharing can help competing firms avoid risks and exploit the value of idle capacity, as well as mitigate price competition under certain conditions, which in turn generates additional profits for the manufacturers compared to the risk-free case.

Key words: co-opetition, horizonal collaboration, capacity sharing, production disruption

摘要： 应对突发事件（如新冠疫情）的实践经验表明，企业之间的横向协作与资源共享（如产能共享）是应对中断风险的有效手段。本研究从理论视角探究横向竞争企业在生产中断风险下的产能共享合约协调机制。通过构建具有横向竞争关系的制造商博弈模型，对比分析了独立经营、集中经营以及两类产能共享合约（事前收入分享合约与事后转移支付合约）的均衡情况。研究发现：两类产能共享合约均能提升抗中断风险能力，其中事前收入分享合约可达到与集中经营相同的效果；两类合约下制造商的期望利润始终高于独立经营，事前收入分享合约更适用于中断概率较大或缺货惩罚成本较小的情形，事后转移支付合约则适用于中断概率较小且缺货惩罚成本较大的情形；在产能共享交易中，事前收入分享合约下生产中断方的让利比例会随缺货惩罚成本的增大而下降，甚至趋近于零，这与事后转移支付合约相反；在中断风险背景下，实施产能共享不仅能帮助竞争企业规避风险、挖掘闲置产能价值，还能在一定条件下缓解价格竞争，为制造商带来相较于无风险时的额外利润。

关键词: 企业竞合, 横向协作, 产能共享, 生产中断