Journal of Systems & Management ›› 2026, Vol. 35 ›› Issue (1): 1-16.DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.2097-4558.2026.01.001

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Complementor Innovation Strategies Choice Under the Influence of Innovative Platform Governance and User Behavior

WANG Qianqian1,2, CHEN Qiang1, WANG Wan1, WANG Xuanxuan3   

  1. 1.School of Economics and Management, Tongji University, Shanghai 200092, China; 2. Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hong Kong 999077, China; 3. Economics and Management School, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China
  • Received:2024-03-18 Revised:2024-08-06 Online:2026-01-28 Published:2026-02-12

创新型平台治理与用户行为影响下互补者创新策略选择

王倩倩1,2,陈强1,汪万1,王璇璇3   

  1. 1.同济大学 经济与管理学院,上海 200092;2. 香港理工大学 工业及系统工程学系,香港 999077;3. 武汉大学,经济与管理学院,武汉 430072
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金资助项目(22VRC126)

Abstract: As key drivers of competitive advantage for innovative platforms, complementors’ choice of innovation strategies are inevitably influenced by both platform governance and heterogeneous user behavior. Therefore, based on a software platform ecosystem, this paper develops a tripartite evolutionary game model incorporating the innovative platform, complementors, and users. By conducting simulation analyses on the sensitivity of key parameters to the strategic choice of each entity, it reveals the dynamic evolutionary process underlying their strategy choice. The findings demonstrate that the primary factor influencing complementors to pursue original innovation is the expected future return generated by such innovation, while the strong governance by the platform companies serves as a secondary mechanism influencing this choice. Measures such as increasing the cost of strong-governance review, lowering the approval rate of imitative-innovation software, and maintaining a reasonable range for the platform’s cost-sharing ratio for promotion can help innovative platforms guide complementors toward original innovation. Although increasing user subsidies has limited influence on complementors’ original innovation decisions and on the platform’s strong-governance efforts, it can effectively improve users’ purchase probability in the early stages of platform development. These findings offer significant practical implications for complementors’ innovation strategy choice and for the formulation of governance strategies by innovative platform enterprises.

Key words: complementor innovation, innovative platform governance, user buying behavior, strategic choice, evolutionary game

摘要: 作为创新型平台构建竞争优势的驱动力,互补者的创新策略选择不可避免地同时受到平台治理与异质性用户行为的影响。因此,本文基于软件平台生态系统,构建了包括创新型平台、互补者与用户的三方演化博弈模型,并通过仿真分析关键参数对各主体策略的敏感性,以揭示其策略选择的动态演化过程。研究表明:互补者选择原创性创新的首要考量因素是原创性创新带来的未来收益,而平台企业的强治理是影响互补者选择原创性创新的次要手段;提高强治理审查费用、降低模仿性创新软件审查通过率、将平台企业对推广成本的分担比例维持在合理区间等,有助于创新型平台引导互补者开展原创性创新;尽管增加用户补贴额度对促进互补者原创性创新与创新型平台强治理方面的影响有限,但在平台发展初期能有效提升用户购买率。研究结果对互补者创新策略选择与创新型平台企业治理策略制定具有重要的实践意义。

关键词: 互补者创新, 创新型平台治理, 用户购买行为, 策略选择, 演化博弈

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