Abstract: When the probability distribution function of random demand is not completely known, retailers can deduce the demand according to the historical demand data. If the retailer does not share the demand data with the manufacturer, the latter can only infer the demand based on the historical order data. This paper studies the price decision of the manufacturer under the condition of whether there is historical information or not, the corresponding order decision of the retailer, and the demand information sharing decision among members of the supply chain. The result shows that when the demand information is asymmetric and the demand inference of the manufacturer is too high, the manufacturer will set a higher wholesale price, the expected profit of the retailer will be less than that when sharing demand information with the manufacturer, and the retailer is more likely to share demand information with the manufacturer. Besides, this paper further analyzes the coordination mechanism of encouraging the retailer to share demand information and increasing the profit of the supply chain.

Key words: demand information sharing, operational decision, supply chain coordination

摘要： 供应链终端随机需求的分布不确定时，制造商和零售商将根据各自掌握信息推断需求分布。若零售商不与制造商分享历史需求数据，制造商将根据零售商的历史订单数据进行需求推断。分析了制造商是否有历史需求数据时的价格决策、零售商相应的订购决策，以及供应链成员之间需求数据分享决策。结论显示：制造商根据零售商订单数据推断的需求过高时，将制定较高的批发价格；零售商的期望利润将比与制造商分享需求数据时少，零售商与制造商共享终端需求数据的可能性较大。进一步分析了激励供应链成员分享需求信息并增加供应链利润的协调机制。

关键词: 需求信息共享, 运营决策, 供应链协调