Journal of Systems & Management ›› 2020, Vol. 29 ›› Issue (1): 174-182.DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1005-2542.2020.01.019

Previous Articles     Next Articles

Pricing and Coordination of Dual-Channel Supply Chain Considering Retailer’s Strategic Inventories

YANG Jiaquan, ZHANG Xumei   

  1. Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400044, China
  • Online:2020-01-29 Published:2020-05-14

考虑零售商策略性库存的双渠道供应链定价及协调

杨家权,张旭梅   

  1. 重庆大学 经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044
  • 通讯作者: 张旭梅(1966-),女,教授,博士生导师。
  • 作者简介:杨家权(1988-),男,博士生。研究方向为双渠道供应链管理
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然科学基金资助项目(71572020)

    国家重点研发计划课题(2018YFB1701502)

Abstract: Considering the scenario that the retailer carries strategic inventories across periods in a dual-channel supply chain, this paper establishes a two-period Stackelberg dynamic game model in which the manufacturer is the leader, and analyzes the impact of the retailer’s strategic inventories on the pricing of the supply chain members. The results show that the retailer can influence the wholesale price decision by carrying strategic inventories across two periods, and then affect the price competition between the traditional retail channel and the direct online channel. Particularly, when the unit inventory holding cost is small, carrying strategic inventories across two periods can increase the retailer’s profit. In order to mitigate the adverse effects of the channel conflict and the double marginalization, this paper designs a combined contract consisting of the wholesale price discount mechanism based on the direct sale price and the transfer payment mechanism. Finally, this paper uses numerical examples to verify that the combined contract can effectively coordinate the strategic inventory decision of the retailer and the pricing of the dual-channel supply chain members in two periods.

Key words: dual-channel, two periods, stategic inventories, price disscount, supply chain coordination

摘要: 针对双渠道供应链环境下,零售商将前期采购的部分产品作为策略性库存用于后期销售的情形,建立了制造商为主方的两周期Stackelberg动态博弈模型,分析了零售商持有策略性库存对双渠道供应链成员定价决策的影响。研究结果表明,零售商可以通过持有策略性库存影响制造商的批发价格决策,进而影响传统零售渠道和电子直销渠道之间的零售价格竞争。特别地,当单位库存持有成本较小时,持有策略性库存能够增加零售商利润。同时,为了缓解渠道冲突和双重边际化问题,构造了基于电子渠道直销价格的批发价格折扣和固定转移支付的组合契约。最后,通过数值分析,验证了此种组合契约同时协调零售商策略性库存决策和双渠道供应链成员两周期定价决策的有效性。

关键词: 双渠道, 两周期, 策略性库存, 价格折扣, 供应链协调

CLC Number: