Abstract: Starting from the perspective of community governance structure, this paper analyzes the current issue of difficulty in collecting property management fees in affordable housing communities, proposes new viewpoints, and enriches paradigms in this field. Based on principal-agent theory, it compares the differences in property management structures between affordable housing and commercial housing communities, and proposes optimal incentive mechanisms under the two management models. The research findings show that the management of affordable housing involves a dual-layer principal-agent structure: the government acts both as an agent responsible for ensuring public welfare and as a principal that hires property management companies, requiring a balance of interests among all three parties. This “sandwich-style” principal-agent structure distorts residents’ incentives toward property management companies, leading to a lack of willingness among residents to proactively pay property fees. To balance its own interests, the benefits of residents, and the profits of property management companies, the government adopts fee reductions and subsidies in managing affordable housing property services as a strategy to achieve a three-way equilibrium.

Key words: affordable housing, property management, dual-layer principle-agent structure, policy implementation

摘要： 本文从社区治理结构出发，分析了当前保障性住房物业收费难的问题，提出了新观点，丰富了对该领域的研究范式。研究运用委托代理理论，对比了保障房与商品房社区物业治理结构上的差异，进而提出了两种治理模式下的最佳激励机制。研究结果表明：首先，保障性住房物业治理存在双层委托代理结构，政府既是保障民生的代理人，又是雇佣物业公司的委托人，需统筹兼顾政府、居民与物业公司三方的利益；其次，这种“三明治”式的委托代理结构会扭曲保障性住房居民对物业公司的激励，导致居民缺乏主动缴纳物业费的意愿；最后，政府为平衡自身收益、居民福利与物业公司利润，在保障性住房物业治理中采取减免与补助措施，实为实现三方利益均衡的一种策略。

关键词: 保障性住房, 物业管理, 双层委托代理, 政策执行