Abstract: Considering the fact that the fairness preference of the retailer affects the decision-making of enterprises in supply chain, a dynamic game model of supply chain is established under the fairness neutrality condition and fairness preference condition. In the model, the retailer predicts market demand information and decides whether or not to share the information with the manufacturer. An analysis of the impact of the fairness preference behavior and the information sharing strategy of the retailer demonstrates that as the fairness preference increases, the wholesale price increases, but the retail price stay unchanged, the utility of the retailer increases, and the utility of the manufacturer decreases. Moreover, information sharing enables the manufacturer to make more accurate decisions and obtain a higher utility. The improvement of information accuracy compensates for the manufacturer’s utility loss caused by the fairness preference of the retailer. However, information sharing reduces the utility of the retailer. Therefore, the retailer will not share information with the manufacturer voluntarily. Furthermore, within a reasonable proportional range of allocation coefficient, the information sharing compensation mechanism enables the retailer with fairness preference to share information voluntarily.

Key words: fairness preference, information sharing, information sharing compensation mechanism, information accuracy, supply chain

摘要： 考虑到零售商的公平偏好行为影响供应链成员企业的决策，分别在零售商公平中性和公平偏好情形下建立供应链动态博弈模型。其中，模型考虑了零售商预测市场需求信息并决定是否向制造商分享信息，旨在探讨零售商的公平偏好行为和信息分享策略对制造商和零售商决策的影响。研究表明：随着零售商公平偏好程度的增加，批发价降低，但零售价不变，零售商的效用增加，而制造商的效用减少；信息分享有助于制造商获得较高的效用，并且提高信息精确度，可以弥补制造商因零售商公平偏好行为带来的效用损失，然而，信息分享使零售商的效用减少，故零售商不会自愿分享预测信息；在合理的效用分配比例范围内，制造商的信息分享补偿机制能够让具有公平偏好行为的零售商自愿分享预测信息。

关键词: 公平偏好, 信息分享, 信息分享补偿机制, 信息精确度, 供应链