Abstract:

Ecolabeling has become an important tool for manufacturers to disclose green quality information. Information asymmetry leads to consumers’ skepticism on ecolabel, which becomes a key factor affecting manufacturers’ ecolabel strategy. By establishing game models among the label originator, the manufacturer, and the retailer, this paper investigates the ecolabeling strategies and differences of design-type and marginal-type green products based on consumer skepticism. The results show that ecolabeling strategies of green products depend on the cost type. Specifically, design-type product prefers industry labeling. However, the ecolabeling strategy of marginal-type product is still related to consumers’ skepticism. If consumers’ skepticism degree is relatively low, governmental labeling will be a better choice; otherwise, industry labeling might be better. In addition, with a relatively higher green level, wholesale/retail prices and green sales effort decisions, governmental labeling outperforms industry labeling from the perspectives of the retailer, consumer surplus, and social welfare. It is more advantageous for manufacturers to choose design-type product when the cost budget of green innovation is high. However, when the cost budget is low or constrainted, manufacturers will choose marginal-type product.

Key words:

consumer skepticism, ecolabel strategy, difference of cost type, game

摘要：

生态标签是制造商披露产品绿色质量信息的重要工具。信息不对称导致的消费者质疑行为成为影响制造商生态标签策略的关键要素。通过构建标签发起者、制造商和零售商之间的博弈模型，研究了基于消费者质疑的设计成本型和边际成本型绿色产品的生态标签策略及其差异性。结果表明，产品的生态标签策略依赖于成本类型。设计型产品侧重选择行业标签。对于边际型产品，当消费者质疑度较低时，政府标签是最优选择；当消费者质疑度较高时，行业标签是最优选择。政府标签下的绿色度、批发/零售价格和促销努力程度均高于行业标签。对于零售商利润、消费者剩余和社会福利而言，政府标签优于行业标签。对于制造商的产品类型选择而言，当绿色创新成本预算较高时，选择设计型产品更为有利；而当成本预算较低或成本预算有约束时，边际型产品为较优选择。

关键词:

消费者质疑行为, 生态标签策略, 成本类型差异性, 博弈