Abstract:

A new power system consisting of a power generation enterprise and an electricity sales enterprise was constructed to address the issue of who will invest in renewable energy storage devices in the new power system. Three scenarios were considered: a power generation enterprise (integrating renewable energy and traditional energy), an electricity sales enterprise, and a renewable energy enterprise, investing in the construction of energy storage equipment. Corresponding Stackelberg models were constructed and solved using the reverse induction method. Based on equilibrium solution, it is found that when the renewable energy generation enterprise invests in energy storage devices, consumers pay a lower electricity price, which helps to increase electricity demand and achieve the highest social welfare. However, when the electricity sales enterprise invests in energy storage devices, consumers pay a higher electricity price, thereby suppressing electricity demand and thus suppressing social welfare. The increase in the cost coefficient of traditional energy generation is beneficial for the access of renewable energy power generation. Therefore, this paper analyzes the impact of energy storage device investment mode on energy storage quality, which, to some extent, would enrich the research in the field of energy storage. Finally, the situation of consumers participating in energy storage investment was studied, further demonstrating the above conclusions.

Key words:

new electricity system, renewable energy storage devices, investment, game

摘要：

针对新型电力系统中谁来投资可再生能源电力储能设备的问题，构建了由发电企业和售电企业组成的新型电力系统。考虑了发电企业（可再生能源与传统能源一体化）、售电企业以及可再生能源企业分别投资建设储能设备3种情形，构建了相应的Stackelberg模型，采用逆向归纳法进行求解。基于均衡结果，主要研究结论如下：① 当可再生能源发电企业投资储能设备时，消费者可以支付更低的电价，有助于提升电力需求量，进而实现最高的社会福利；当售电企业投资储能设备时，消费者需要支付更高的电价，从而抑制电力需求量，进而抑制社会福利。② 随着储能设备投资成本系数的增加，传统能源电力需求量会增加，但售电企业的利润会减少。③ 传统能源发电成本系数的增加有利于可再生能源电力发电上网。因此，本文分析储能设备投资模式对储能质量影响的问题，在一定程度上丰富了储能领域的研究。最后，讨论部分研究了消费者参与储能投资的情形，进一步论证上述结论。

关键词:

新型电力系统, 可再生能源储能设备, 投资, 博弈论