Abstract:

Based on the organizational justice theory, existing studies have found that undervalued independent directors are more likely to quit due to perceived unfairness. However, the existing research cannot explain why some undervalued independent directors do not choose to quit, and that those “undervalued” independent directors who stayed on the board would have more promotion opportunities later. In order to answer the above questions, by introducing the social exchange theory in addition to the organizational justice theory, arguments are derived that the social exchange relationship of independent directors (based on the social exchange theory) has a negative moderating effect on the positive relationship between the undervaluation of independent directors and their turnovers (based on the organizational justice theory). Moreover, the undervalued independent directors who do not quit will have more chances of “promotion” (based on the organizational justice theory). The empirical study of the data of the independent directors of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2017 supports the above theoretical inferences. To be specific, the social exchange relationship plays a significant negative moderating role in the relationship between the undervaluation of independent directors and their turnovers. Specifically, when the undervalued independent directors are appointed by the current chairman, or when the undervalued independent directors have better social skills, the positive effect of their undervaluation on turnovers is weaker. For independent directors who are undervalued and do not quit, they are more likely to be “promoted” later.

Key words: independent director, undervaluation, organizational justice, social exchange, quit, promotion

摘要：

现有研究基于组织公平理论发现，“价值被低估”的独立董事会因感知的不公平而选择离职。但是现有研究不能解释为何还有部分“价值被低估”独立董事没有选择离职，并且那些继续留任的“价值被低估”独立董事后来还会拥有较多的“晋升”机会。为回答上述问题，在组织公平理论基础上引入社会交换理论，认为独立董事的社会交换关系（基于社会交换理论）对独立董事“价值低估”与离职之间的正向关系（基于组织公平理论）具有负向调节作用。并且，价值被低估且没有离职的独立董事此后会拥有更多的“晋升”机会（基于组织公平理论）。基于中国A股上市公司2008～2017年独立董事任职数据，实证研究结果支持了上述理论推断。实证结果如下：① 社会交换关系在独立董事“价值低估”与离职之间发挥显著的负向调节作用。具体而言，当“价值被低估”的独立董事是由现任董事长任命，或者“价值被低估”的独立董事具有较好的社交技能时，独立董事价值低估对离职的正向影响较弱。② 对于“价值被低估”且没有离职的独立董事而言，其后期获得“晋升”的可能性更大。

关键词: 独立董事, 价值低估, 组织公平, 社会交换, 离职, 晋升